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DOUBLE-TROUBLE: THE UNDERREGULATION OF 
SURREPTITIOUS VIDEO SURVEILLANCE IN 
CONJUNCTION WITH THE USE OF SNITCHES IN 
DOMESTIC GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATIONS 
 
Mona R. Shokrai* 
 
[1] Technological advancements in digital imagery and visual recordings 
have all but vitiated any expectation of privacy in public places.  Yet this 
Orwellian state of constant governmental surveillance has extended beyond 
the scope of public observation.  Closely-held expectations of privacy in 
the most intimate locations have also become subject to government 
observation.  The means by which the government is able to garner such 
detailed information concerning the minutiae of our private lives is in need 
of assessment. 
 
[2] Covert video surveillance is one of the most intrusive mechanisms by 
which law enforcement officials can gather incriminating evidence.  The 
invasiveness of this investigative technique requires that some kind of 
procedural safeguards be applied in order to protect our fundamental 
interests against government searches and seizures under the Fourth 
Amendment.1  However, there are currently no guidelines in place to 
regulate domestic investigations utilizing any form of video surveillance.  
Protective doctrines such as the warrant requirement and its procedural 
                                          
*J.D., Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, 2006.  Mona.Shokrai@gmail.com.  The issues 
raised in this Article stemmed from my legal work with Richard G. Novak, Esq., to whom 
I am indelibly grateful for providing me with the knowledge and excitement to write about 
this gap in the law.  Many thanks to Gina Genova, Mariana Mello, Natalie Artin, Professor 
Susan Bakhshian, and Professor Gary Marx for their thoughts and assistance.  Special 
thanks to Professor Alexandra Natapoff for her guidance and feedback throughout the 
process—and for being impressed with my “willingness to try hard things.”  A very 
special thank you to Amir Aharonov who contributed countless hours of his insight, hard 
critique, and brilliance. 
 
1 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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hurdles protect our rights against government intrusion in private locations.  
When these procedural safeguards are circumvented, our constitutional 
rights become placed in jeopardy of governmental violation. 
 
[3] Despite the lack of specific regulation for video surveillance, many 
courts have applied provisions of related doctrines, such as the law 
governing wiretapping and electronic surveillance,2 to this type of 
investigation.  When surreptitious video surveillance is carried out in 
conjunction with the use of consenting informants, a regulatory loophole is 
created that can result in unjustified governmental intrusions upon the 
rights of the surveillee.  The confluence of these two areas of jurisprudence 
creates a path by which law enforcement officials are able to effectively 
bypass the warrant requirement or any other applicable procedural hurdle.  
Without creating specifically tailored legislation or precedent to govern 
investigations utilizing snitches to surreptitiously videotape the subjects of 
an investigation, the police need only find an accomplice to circumvent all 
constitutional protections.3 
 
[4] This paper discusses this problem in current regulation and the 
implications of this regulatory inconsistency.  Part I discusses the law 
governing domestic video surveillance under its current judicial 
permutations.  It also illustrates the inconsistency in application by looking 
at a jurisdictional survey of case law on the topic.  Part II discusses the 
current law governing the use of snitches in undercover investigations, the 
effects of which have created the regulatory loophole at issue.  Part III then 
discusses the institutional, social, and regulatory ramifications of allowing 
such regulatory inconsistencies to persist. 
 
I.  CURRENT LAW GOVERNING VIDEO SURVEILLANCE 
 
[5] The pervasiveness of video cameras and other visual recording devices 
in daily life supports the need for regulations and parameters in place to 
govern their uses.4  The amount of detail that can be garnered from video 
                                          
2 See e.g. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2518 (2001). 
3 See Melanie L. Black Dubis, The Consensual Electronic Surveillance Experiment: State 
Courts React to United States v. White, 47 VAND L. REV. 857 (1994). 
4 See Christopher Slobogin, Technologically-Assisted Physical Surveillance:  The 
American Bar Association’s Tentative Draft Standards, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 383, 405 
(1997).  The author states that the ABA’s definition of video surveillance excludes “the 
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surveillance recordings underscores the necessity for applicable 
guidelines.5  There is no single rule in application that regulates various 
forms of video surveillance and recording in both the public and private 
spheres.  While public locations are considered “fair game”6 as the subject 
of virtually any method of surveillance under the doctrine of public 
exposure,7the most significant deficiencies in regulation arise from covert, 
hidden, or surreptitious video surveillance8 of private locations.9 
 
A.  SURREPTITIOUS VIDEO SURVEILLANCE PROMPTS A HIKE IN THE LEVEL 
OF INTRUSION UPON THE PRIVACY INTEREST OF THE SURVEILLEE 
 
[6] Advancements in surveillance technology have supplied law 
enforcement with numerous new investigative tools, tactics, and methods.  
These advancements have been the source of tremendous simplification 
and ease, providing investigators with time and effort saving advantages to 
more traditional painstaking investigative tactics.10  Nonetheless, these 
advances have simultaneously created the prospect of colossal invasions 
into individual privacy.11  Video camera surveillance is distinguishable 
                                                                                                        
use of a ‘lawfully positioned’ camera to view or record activities ‘occurring within the 
sight or immediate vicinity of a law enforcement official (or agent thereof) who is aware 
of such use.’” Id. at 414. 
5 Id. at 385-408.  
6 This refers to the lack of any expectation of privacy an individual is held to retain, and 
the consequential authority vested in the surveillors to implement such surveillance 
without having to stay within any defined boundaries. 
7 The Fourth Amendment does not protect what one knowingly exposes to the public.  
Information, actions, and conduct that are “knowingly exposed to the public” are 
considered to be in plain view.  Consequently, capturing or viewing this content by any 
method of surveillance, is not defined as a “search” under the ambit of Fourth Amendment 
protection. In contrast, Constitutional protection extends to that which one keeps private 
(even within a public location). See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
8 See Slobogin, supra note 4, at 414.  Professor Christopher Slobogin clarifies the 
determination for covert surveillance by including whether the law enforcement surveyor 
“intends that the subject of the surveillance be unaware of the monitoring and if a 
reasonable person in the subject’s position would be unaware of it.”  Id. at 414-15.  
9 The focus of this paper is on covert video surveillance that is conducted in private 
locations.  Public or overt video surveillance, which carry independent concerns under the 
realm of Fourth Amendment analysis, are not within the scope of this paper.   
10 See Ric Simmons, Symposium: The Powers and Pitfalls of Technology: Technology-
Enhanced Surveillance By Law Enforcement Officials, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 711 
(2005). 
11 Id. at 711. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XIII, Issue1 
 
4 
from traditional physical searches.12  Because of this prospect, our society 
should focus less on investigative efficiency, and more on the need to 
reinforce and safeguard our Fourth Amendment rights with more vigor.  
 
[7] In Lopez v. United States, the United States Supreme Court established 
that the use of technology adds no greater intrusion to a search.13  
However, the nuances of video surveillance distinguish it from the oral or 
wire communications the Court discusses in Lopez.  Physical searches, or 
even aural surveillance and recordation, do not reach the level of 
invasiveness that is the product of visual surveillance and recordation.  The 
minutiae or peripheral imagery captured, oftentimes containing visual cues 
beyond the line of sight of any cooperating informant or party to the 
conversation, can be reviewed, enlarged, or even enhanced to provide the 
investigating agents with evidence they would not have been able to 
acquire by any other means.14  No debriefing or testimony provided by an 
informant or party to the conversation would be able to match the fine 
details or imagery depicted and acquired by a video recording.15   
 
[8] Federal appellate courts visiting this issue have also characterized 
surreptitious video surveillance as “one of the most intrusive investigative 
                                          
12 See GARY T. MARX, UNDERCOVER: POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA 217-19 (1988).  
In his book on covert police action, Professor Marx notes ten characteristics of new 
investigative technologies “that set them apart from most traditional forms of social 
control”: 
(1) The new surveillance transcends distance, darkness, and physical 
barriers; 
(2) It transcends time; its records can be stored, retrieved, combined, 
analyzed, and communicated; 
(3) It has low visibility or is invisible; 
(4) It is often involuntary; 
(5) Prevention is a major concern; 
(6) It is capital- rather than labor-intensive; 
(7) It involves decentralized self-policing; 
(8) It triggers a shift from targeting a specific suspect to category suspicion 
of everyone (or at least everyone within a particular category); 
(9) It is more intensive; and 
(10) It is more extensive. 
13 Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963). 
14 See Christopher S. Milligan, Note, Facial Recognition Technology, Video Surveillance, 
and Privacy, 9 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 295, 309-11 (1999). 
15 United States v. Davis, 326 F.3d 361, 367 (S.D.N.Y 2003); Lopez, 373 U.S. at 439.  
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mechanisms available to law enforcement.”16  In particular, the Ninth 
Circuit has acknowledged and integrated this description of hidden video 
surveillance in its interpretations and in its rulings on several cases 
involving covert visual recording and surveillance during criminal 
investigations.  Because of its invasiveness, video surveillance has been 
found to reach “beyond the perimeter of a person’s reasonable expectations 
of privacy”—far beyond the scope of other electronic monitoring devices.17  
The Ninth Circuit further noted, “[t]he silent, unblinking lens of the camera 
was intrusive in a way that no temporary search of [a home or] office could 
have been.”18 
 
[9] In United States v. Nerber, the Ninth Circuit noted, “[t]he sweeping, 
indiscriminate manner in which video surveillance can intrude upon us, 
regardless of where we are, dictates that its use be approved only in limited 
circumstances.”19  Further, Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit, visiting the 
issue of regulating video surveillance in his concurrence in United States v. 
Koyomejian, articulated:  
 
As every court considering the issue has noted, video 
surveillance can result in extraordinarily serious intrusions 
into personal privacy.  Is it reasonable to place a camera in 
the home where it is likely to monitor people while they go 
to the bathroom, while they engage in intimate relations, 
while they cook and clean, while they sweep dirt under the 
rug? If such intrusions are ever permissible, they must be 
justified by an extraordinary showing of need.20 
 
[10] Since courts consider video surveillance an immense intrusion into 
personal privacy, our society must be concerned with the current state of 
regulatory limbo.  Despite the need for a universally applicable set of 
guidelines controlling the use of video surveillance, there is more room for 
irregularity because jurisdictionally-specific approaches currently govern 
this process.  
                                          
16 United States v. Nerber, 222 F.3d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 2000).  
17 United States v. Andonian, 735 F.Supp. 1469,1478 (9th Cir. 1990). 
18 United States v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 677 (9th Cir. 1991). 
19 Nerber, 222 F.3d at 603. 
20 United States v. Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536, 551 (9th Cir. 1992) (Kozinski, J., 
concurring). 




B.  DISTINCT JURISPRUDENTIAL APPROACHES TO COVERT VIDEO 
SURVEILLANCE 
 
[11] Circuit courts facing the issue of covert, surreptitious video 
surveillance from within private locations have applied various approaches 
– some courts drawing on existing criminal jurisprudence for analysis, 
while other courts have failed to articulate any approach.  Commonality 
between some circuits can only be found in application of two main 
branches of criminal jurisprudence to this inquiry: (1) Analysis under the 
Fourth Amendment,21 and (2) The application of Title III’s regulations 
governing “electronic communications.”22  Of those circuits that have 
ventured to create an analytical framework, some circuits have drawn on 
the former exclusively, others exclusively on the latter, while even other 
circuits have taken this analysis beyond the bounds of these two 
approaches by uniquely hybridizing these two doctrines into a more narrow 
approach toward video surveillance.  Regardless of which approach a court 
decides to apply, however, the current state of regulation is still unclear. 
 
1. ANALYSIS OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION 
 
[12] The foundational issue in any Fourth Amendment analysis is whether 
a search or seizure has taken place.23  This determination depends on 
whether the subject of the search, in this case the individual being 
surveilled, had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the locale at issue.24  
But what constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy?  Courts have 
been grappling with this issue in various contexts for quite some time.   
 
[13] Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Katz v. United States25 
provided the benchmark standard from which to analyze whether the 
subject of a search had a reasonable expectation of privacy.  A legally 
cognizable expectation of privacy must not only objectively be one that 
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable, but the individual being 
                                          
21 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
22 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2001). 
23 Slobogin, supra note 4 at 389.  
24 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
25 Id. 
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searched must also have a subjective expectation of privacy in that 
particular encounter.26    
 
[14] The traditional inquiry often involves some sort of physical intrusion 
that implicates this analysis.27  However, covert video surveillance often 
fails to generate any form of physical contact.  Nonetheless, the Fourth 
Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable searches does not retreat 
simply because no physical intrusion has transpired.28   
 
[15] The intrusion effected by the common physical search29 is terminated 
at the conclusion of the encounter; the subject of this search will generally 
be confident that all such contact has ceased.  In contrast, the subject of 
video surveillance can never be certain that an encounter is taking place, 
and if so, at what point it has terminated,30 rendering video searches more 
intrusive and of a nature that may be characterized as one that society is 
prepared to recognize as objectively unreasonable.  As long as the subject 
of the video surveillance can demonstrate a subjective expectation of 
privacy in the subject of the surveillance, the surveillee may maintain a 
Katz claim that he or she did have a reasonable expectation of privacy, 
notwithstanding the lack of any physical intrusion or contact during the 
encounter.31 
 
                                          
26 Id. at 361. 
27 Id. at 352-53. 
28 Id.  
It is true that the absence of [physical] penetration was at one time thought to 
foreclose further Fourth Amendment inquiry . . . for that amendment was thought 
to limit only searches and seizures of tangible property.  But the premise that 
property interests control the right of the Government to search and seizure has 
been discredited.   
Id. (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967)). 
29 Primitive searches refer to those generating physical contact between the law 
enforcement agent and the subject of the search.  Common examples include a pat-down 
on the subject’s person, or the search of closed cabinets within a private dwelling.  
30 See Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space: 
Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World that Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX. L. REV. 
1349, 1355-56 (2004). 
31  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).  Katz involved no physical intrusion, 
yet the court recognized that the defendant did maintain a reasonable expectation of 
privacy and as such, his Fourth Amendment rights were maintained. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XIII, Issue1 
 
8 
[16] When faced with the issue of admissibility of evidence acquired 
through video surveillance, the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Mesa-
Rincon noted, “[t]he Fourth Amendment protects us against ‘unreasonable 
searches and seizures.’  To determine whether a search is ‘reasonable,’ we 
must balance the intrusiveness of the method used and the expectation of 
privacy in the premises searched with the government’s showing of 
necessity for the search.”32   In order to fairly scrutinize the regulation of 
surreptitious video surveillance, these conflicting interests must be 
evaluated.  From a law enforcement perspective, video surveillance not 
only enhances investigative capabilities, but also prompts a sharp decrease 
in the strain on investigative resources.  Despite such countervailing 
benefits to state interests, use of covert video surveillance as an 
investigative tool engenders a plethora of consequences, causing severe 
detriment to the interests of the individual.33  
 
[17] The impetus for constructing the warrant requirement, as found in the 
language and composition of the Fourth Amendment, was to safeguard the 
individual from any unjustifiable intrusion, either generated by the search 
itself or as a byproduct of a proper search.34  Beyond the elemental 
                                          
32 United States v. Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433, 1442 (10th Cir. 1990).  See also, 
Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 5 
(1991). In his article, Professor Slobogin notes, “As American courts have recognized, the 
regulation of search and seizure involves balancing the conflicting state and individual 
interests implicated by the investigative process.” Id. at 5.  As video surveillance and other 
technologically advanced investigative tools streamline the process of gathering evidence, 
we are left only with the Fourth Amendment to protect our privacy rights and 
expectations.  In characterizing the regulation of a search carried out through video 
surveillance, we must first consider this balancing—between the usefulness of video 
surveillance for the state’s investigations, and the intrusiveness of video surveillance upon 
the individual’s privacy.  
33 Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 222 (1981)  
[I]n those situations in which a search warrant is necessary, the 
inconvenience incurred by the police is generally insignificant.  
Whatever practical problems [there are in requiring a search 
warrant]…they cannot outweigh the constitutional interest at stake in 
protecting the right of presumptively innocent people to be secure in 
their homes from unjustified, forcible intrusions by the government. 
34 U.S. Const. amend. IV  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath 
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probable cause requirement,35 law enforcement agents must obtain a 
warrant prior to initiating a search.  The warrant requirement compels 
investigators to seek ex ante authorization from a neutral and detached 
judicial officer before properly initiating a search.36  Warrantless searches 
are per se unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.  However, if the 
encounter falls within one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant 
requirement,37 most of which are based on principles of exigency, a 
warrantless search may be permissible.  If none of these exceptions apply 
and a search is carried out without a warrant, the subject of the search has a 
viable claim for the suppression of any evidence gathered or fruits derived 
therefrom.38   
 
[18] Additional constraints emerge from the particularity requirement, 
effectively limiting the scope of an investigation.  The Supreme Court in 
Berger v. New York39 visited the need for such particularity, especially in 
the context of eavesdropping: 
 
The need for particularity and evidence of reliability in the 
showing required when judicial authorization of a search is 
sought is especially great in the case of eavesdropping.  By 
its very nature eavesdropping involves an intrusion on 
                                                                                                        
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
35 Although there are various situations where probable cause is not required, the issues 
that arise within the scope of this paper are not applied to such situations.   
36 Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 212, 214 (1981) (“Absent exigent circumstances, a 
magistrate, rather than a police officer, must make the decision that probable cause exists 
to believe that person or object to be seized is within a particular place.”). 
37 When there is an applicable exception to the warrant requirement, the law enforcement 
officials do not need to obtain a warrant before initiating the search because the 
circumstances at issue validate the search and the use of evidence found therein.  The 
exceptions are fact-specific and oftentimes complex, but generally arise in the following 
circumstances: (i) when there are exigent circumstances, (ii) an item is in plain view, (iii) 
the search involves a mobile automobile, (iv) the search is incident to the subject’s arrest, 
(v) the subject consented to the search, (vi) the search is within a ‘sensitive area’ (such as 
an airport or border), or (vii) the search is cursory and only requires reasonable suspicion.  
See State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wn.2d 61, 71, 917 P.2d 563, 572 (Wash. 1996) (citing 
Robert F. Utter, Survey of Washington Search and Seizure Law:  1988 Update, 73 U. 
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 411, 528-80 (1988)). 
38 Slobogin, supra note 4 at 449.  
39 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 56 (1967). 
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privacy that is broad in scope.  As was said in Osborn v. 
United States40, the ‘indiscriminate use of such devices in 
law enforcement raises grave constitutional questions under 
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments,’ and imposes ‘heavier 
responsibility on this Court in its supervision of the fairness 
of procedures.’41 
 
The Court went on to discuss how a lack of such particularity, in effect, 
bypasses the purpose and rationale of the probable cause requirement: 
 
The Fourth Amendment’s requirement that a warrant 
‘particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized,’ repudiate[s] general warrants 
and ‘makes general searches…impossible and prevents the 
seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another.  As 
to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the 
officer executing the warrant.42 
 
Insofar as these obstacles are in place and a warrant is properly executed, a 
higher probability of the integrity of the search is maintained.43  
 
[19] If the video surveillance is conducted either pursuant to a properly 
executed warrant or without a warrant but properly justified by one of the 
recognized exceptions, video surveillance is permitted and admissible 
against the surveillee.  Courts analyzing investigations utilizing 
surreptitious video surveillance have generally rejected claims that its 
inherent intrusiveness makes it per se unconstitutional under the Fourth 
Amendment.44  
                                          
40 Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 329 n.7 (1966). 
41 Berger, 388 U.S. at 56. 
42 Id. at 58-59.  
43 It should also be noted that while the Berger Court recognized this necessity in the 
general context of eavesdropping, it follows that such particularity is even more vital 
when dealing with hyper-intrusive eavesdropping techniques such as covert video 
surveillance. 
44 See e.g.  United States v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. 
Andonian, 735 F. Supp. 1469, 1478 (C.D. Cal 1990); United States v. Gonzalez, 328 F.3d 
543 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Shryock, 342 F.3d 948, 978 (9th Cir. 2003); United 
States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1984). 




2. APPLICATION OF TITLE III TO VIDEO SURVEILLANCE 
 
[20] When enacted in 1968, the drafters of Title III of the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act of 196845 purported to create a more efficient 
regulatory framework for controlling wiretaps, bugging devices, and other 
similar aural surveillance methods.  They aimed to create strict and narrow 
prerequisites that were difficult to meet, in an effort to justify the increased 
level of intrusion upon an individual’s personal privacy.46  While Title III 
does not expressly address video surveillance, courts occasionally apply its 
designation of “electronic communications”47 in cases involving video 
surveillance investigations.48  
 
[21] First and foremost, Title III imposes a probable cause requirement, 
analogous to that found under the prescriptions of the Fourth 
Amendment.49  Without demonstrating probable cause to support the 
investigator’s belief that the subject of the impending investigation “has 
committed, is committing, or is about to commit a particular offense”50 and 
that surveying such communications will provide evidence of this 
commission,51 the agent seeking judicial authorization under Title III 
should be unsuccessful. 
 
[22] In addition to this preliminary showing, Title III’s procedural 
regulations mandate that each application for a wiretap include facts 
sufficient for the reviewing judge to conclude, “normal investigative 
                                          
45 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (2001)). 
46 Id. 
(d) To safeguard the privacy of innocent persons, the interception of 
wire or oral communications where none of the parties to the 
communication has consented to the interception should be allowed only 
when authorized by a court of competent jurisdiction and should remain 
under the control and supervision of the authorizing court.  Interception 
of wire and oral communications should further be limited to certain 
major types of offenses and specific categories of crime with assurances 
that the interception is justified and that the information obtained 
thereby will not be misused. 
47 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2001). 
48 Id. 
49 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2001). 
50 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a) (2001). 
51 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(b). 
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procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be 
unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.”52  This prong can be 
met via a convincing argument from the investigating officer that other 
methods would be unavailing.  Rationale for the existence of this particular 
requirement is based on the desire to strictly limit the use of wiretaps and 
ensure that it is not resorted to in situations where “traditional investigative 
measures”53 would suffice to expose the crime.54  Absent specific 
circumstances that render normal investigative techniques particularly 
ineffective, the application must be denied.55 
 
[23] The next statutory constraint requiring a high degree of specificity for 
the purported allegations is akin to the particularity requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment.56  In the same vein as warrant requirement logic, Title 
III requires a showing of particularity of the places to be searched and 
items to be seized in the application’s endorsement of necessity.57    
 
[24] In an effort to prevent abuses of this potentially harmful privilege, 
Section 2518(5) of Title III additionally requires a degree of minimization 
during the period of interception.58 Without this constraint, the law 
enforcement officials conducting the interception would have almost 
limitless access to their subjects’ private conversations.  As a result, these 
investigators may improperly be exposed to incriminating evidence that 
they were not otherwise privy to.  By further adding a thirty-day limitation 
on the period of judicially authorized interception, the drafters of Title III 
recognized its high potential for abuse.59   
 
                                          
52 S. REP. NO. 1097, at 101 (1968) ("Normal investigative procedure would include, for 
example, standard visual or aural surveillance techniques by law enforcement officers, 
general questioning or interrogation under an immunity grant, use of regular search 
warrants, and the infiltration of conspiratorial groups by undercover agents or 
informants..."). 
53 United States v. Commito, 918 F.2d 95, 98 (9th Cir. 1990). 
54 See e.g. United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 152 (1974); United States v. Brown, 761 
F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1985); Commito, 918 F.2d at 98; United States v. Smith, 893 F.2d 
1573, 1582 (9th Cir. 1990). 
55 See United States v. Ippolito, 774 F.2d 1482, 1486 (9th Cir. 1985). 
56 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) (2001). 
57 Id. 
58 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (2001). 
59 Id.  
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[25] The remedy for a violation of the wiretap’s procedural regulations is 
suppression.  Section 2518(10)(a) of the federal wiretap statute provides in 
pertinent part, “Any aggrieved person in any trial . . . before any court . . . 
may move to suppress the contents of any wire or oral communication 
intercepted . . . or evidence derived therefrom, on the grounds that . . . the 
order of authorization or approval under which it was intercepted is 
insufficient on its face.”60  Essentially, if the affidavit fails to satisfy the 
necessity requirement or is procedurally defective in some way, the 
reviewing court is expected to suppress the communications at issue in 
order to safeguard the privacy interests of the parties to the interception. 
 
[26] In 1968, when Title III61 was passed, video technology had just begun 
to emerge as an investigative tool.62  As such, there was little chance that 
such a budding development would have specific reference in the statute.  
Despite the fact that the technology for video surveillance—and even 
surreptitious video surveillance—has been widely available to the general 
public for quite some time,63 both the courts and our legislative bodies have 
failed to affirmatively regulate this area.  Peculiarly, a great deal of 
particularized attention has been placed upon the regulation of aural 
surveillance and other types of electronic communications, while visual 
surveillance has been all but ignored.  As the rationale for implementing 
these regulations on aural and electronic surveillance is based mainly upon 
the need to normalize investigative methods that are so frequently utilized, 
it is unclear why visual surveillance (which is also used quite frequently) 
has not been similarly regulated.   
 
[27] Future amendments to Title III fail to shed any light on the intended 
regulation of video surveillance or recordings.  The Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (“ECPA”)64 amended Title III to 
                                          
60 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a)(ii) (2001). 
61 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (2001). 
62 See generally Robert C. Owen and Melissa Mather, The Decisionmaking Process:  
Thawing Out the “Cold Record”:  Some Thoughts on How Videotaped Records May 
Affect Traditional Standards of Deference on Direct and Collateral Review, 2 J. APP. 
PRAC. & PROCESS 411 (2000).  
63 Miniaturized cameras for “discreet / unobtrusive surveillance” are inexpensive and 
publicly available for commercial use.  See 
http://www.wecusurveillance.com/page/435746. 
64 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522.  Congress renamed Title III as the “Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986,” which is the amendment of the 1968 statute. 
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include the interception of electronic communications.  In fact, Congress 
explicitly stated that the ECPA was not meant to include video 
surveillance.  In the Senate Judiciary Committee Report accompanying the 
ECPA, the Committee reaffirmed the statutory definition of ‘aural 
acquisition’ and went on to clarify that “[o]ther forms of surveillance are 
not within the proposed legislation.”65  Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit 
visited the issue of the omission of video surveillance from the 
amendments to Title III and posited,   
 
Does it really follow that, had Congress considered the 
matter directly, it would have treated video surveillance 
exactly the same as those methods it did consider? I find it 
more plausible to infer that by choosing to exclude video 
surveillance . . . Congress and the President were 
recognizing that it is different from wiretapping and should 
not be treated as the same.66 
 
[28] In the interim, however, law enforcement officials are making use of 
these new technologies without express regulations to follow.  Ultimately, 
the judiciary is left to regulate these matters, as defendants move to 
suppress the resulting evidence.67   
 
3. HYBRID APPROACH TO VIDEO SURVEILLANCE RECORDINGS 
 
[29] As there is no statute applicable to domestic recordings produced via 
surreptitious video surveillance, courts facing this issue have been 
developing creative ways to adjudicate it.  Most notably, various courts 
have bifurcated the evidence itself, separating the evidence into the audio-
only component and the silent video component, before determining its 
                                          
65 S. REP. NO. 1097, at 90 (1968); see also United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 886 (7th 
Cir. 1984); Simmons, supra note 10, at 733, n46. 
66 United States v. Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536, 551 (9th Cir. 1992). 
67 Id. at 551  
By rushing to develop a code that will comprehensively deal with video 
warrants on its first outing in the field, my colleagues have overreached.  
Attempting the task normally reserved to the political branches, they 
have abdicated the adjudicatory function while undertaking the task of 
legislation badly.  The result is that they have shackled the government 
with more restrictions than the Constitution imposes, while at the same 
time giving citizens less protection than the Constitution affords them. 
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admissibility.68  The reviewing courts will then apply Title III to the audio-
only component, while leaving the admissibility of the silent video 
component contingent on satisfaction of the Fourth Amendment 
requirements.69   
 
[30] Despite the logic of this analytical approach, the inconsistency 
promulgated by these alternative methods of interpretation is becoming 
problematic.  Without a generally applicable framework, subjects of video 
surveillance are held only to the judicial standards found in their 
jurisdiction while individual privacy protections and the admissibility of 
such evidence can differ from circuit to circuit.  
 
 
C.  JURISDICTIONAL SURVEY OF CASE LAW DEALING WITH VIDEO 
SURVEILLANCE 
 
[31] Despite judicial recognition that this video surveillance does carry 
tendencies of heightened intrusiveness, the courts have generally found this 
level of intrusion to remain permissible under certain jurisdictionally 
specific guidelines.  Yet, we are left with inconsistency, regardless of 
which approach a lower court chooses to apply.  
 
1.  SUPREME COURT 
 
[32] The Supreme Court’s analysis of electronic surveillance in several 
cases has provided us with a barebones regulatory scheme that many lower 
courts have applied to more specific methods of investigation.70  Despite 
the statutory omission, many lower courts have made attempts to force the 
video surveillance square peg into the general electronic surveillance round 
hole.71 
                                          
68 See e.g. United States v. Shryock, 342 F.3d 948, 978 (9th Cir. 2003); see also, United 
States v. Honken, 378 F. Supp.2d 880 (8th Cir. 2004); United States v. Gonzalez, Inc., 412 
F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Fernandez, 388 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2004); 
United States v. Smith, 413 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 2005).  
69 Shryock, 342 F.3d at 978. Audio portions of the recording fall under the ambit of Title 
III and will be admitted or suppressed based on that analysis.  Then a separate analysis 
based on Fourth Amendment principles governs the silent visual recordings captured. 
70 See Mulligan, supra, note 14 at 315-17.  
71 See Kanya A. Bennett, Comment, Can Facial Recognition Technology be used to Fight 
the New War Against Terrorism?: Examining the Constitutionality of Facial Recognition 
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[33] In the 1967 case of Berger v. New York,72 the Supreme Court 
recognized that certain methods of investigation produce greater invasions 
on individual privacy and autonomy than the classic physical search.  The 
subject of Berger was the regulation of government-initiated “electronic 
eavesdropping”73 in a New York statute.  The state statute required the 
government investigator to present, under oath, a statement that provides: 
 
[T]hat there is reasonable ground to believe that evidence of 
a crime may be thus obtained, and particularly describing 
the person or persons whose communications, conversations 
or discussions are to be overheard or recorded and the 
purpose thereof . . . [and] in connection with the issuance of 
such an order the justice or judge … shall satisfy himself of 
the existence of reasonable grounds for the granting of such 
an application.74   
 
The Court held that this statute was in violation of the Fourth Amendment, 
as it did not meet the threshold prescriptions of the warrant requirement.75  
“In short, the [New York] statute’s blanket grant of permission to 
eavesdrop [was] without adequate judicial supervision or protective 
procedures.”76   
 
[34] The Berger Court avoided the task of creating particularized 
guidelines and parameters that were applicable for a more in-depth Fourth 
                                                                                                        
Surveillance Systems, 3 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 151, 169 (2001); see generally Mulligan, supra 
note 10.  
72 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
73 Id. at 49. 
74 Id. at 44.  
75 See Simmons, supra note 10, at 552 (2003)  
The Court held that orders issued under the statute would not conform to 
the particularity requirement, since the order need only describe ‘the 
person or persons whose communications . . . are to be overheard.’ . . . 
The Court [also] held that allowing the monitoring to continue for two 
months ‘is the equivalent of a series of intrusions, searches, and seizures 
pursuant to a single showing of probable cause.’ . . . [And further, that] 
the Court was trouble by the fact that there was no mandatory 
termination of the order ... [or that there be a showing of] exigent 
circumstances in order to justify the lack of notice.   
76 Berger, 388 U.S. at 59.  
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Amendment analysis of electronic surveillance or its counterparts.77  In 
recognizing this regulatory lag, the Court found, “[t]he law, though jealous 
of individual privacy, has not kept pace with these advances in scientific 
knowledge.”78  Similarly, in Lopez v. United States, the Court again 
recognized that “the fantastic advances in the field of electronic 
communication constitute a great danger to the privacy of the individual 
 . . . . [I]ndiscriminate use of such devices in law enforcement raises grave 
constitutional questions under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.”79  By 
failing to keep up with these types of advances, investigative methods 
utilizing these tools may continue to be carried out with little regulatory 
guidance.80  Despite the Court’s recognition that the law has not been able 
to keep up with technology, no default standard has been set.81  Instead, 
issues involving video surveillance have been dealt with on a case-by-case 
basis on the federal appellate level, which has led to a jurisdictional rift in 
interpretation. 
 
2.  CLEAR SPLIT IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS 
 
[35] In 1984, the Seventh Circuit became the first federal appellate court to 
consider and subsequently rule on surreptitious video surveillance as an 
investigative tool.82  In United States v. Torres,83 the Seventh Circuit 
                                          
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 49. 
79 Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 441 (1963). 
80 Berger, 388 U.S. at 56 (Stewart, J., concurring).  Justice Stewart’s opinion in Berger 
underscores the need for heightened restrictions when dealing with an intrusive method of 
investigation, which in this case was trespassory eavesdropping through bugging devices.  
Justice Steward stated,  
The need for particularity and evidence of reliability in the showing 
required when judicial authorization is sought for the kind of electronic 
eavesdropping involved in this case is especially great.  The standard of 
reasonableness embodied in the Fourth Amendment demands that the 
showing of justification match the degree of intrusion. 
This analysis applies with equal force to covert video surveillance, though it was not at 
issue in Berger, as video surveillance has been characterized as more intrusive than the 
type of eavesdropping at issue here.  
81 Id. at 118 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White’s opinion addresses the issue of whether 
“this case [is] a proper vehicle for resolving all of these broad constitutional and 
legislative issues raised by the problem of official use of wiretapping and eavesdropping.” 
Id.  
82 Simmons, supra note 10, at 556-59. 
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emphasized the fact that no existing statute explicitly dealt with covert 
video surveillance, including both Title III and the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act.84 However, the court used Rule 41 of 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure85 to provide judicial authorization 
to grant warrants for such surveillance.86  At first glance, this placed 
analysis of covert video surveillance under the ambit of general Fourth 
Amendment principles.  Yet, the approach taken actually synthesized 
Fourth Amendment principles with some of the more narrow constraints 
applicable to other forms of electronic surveillance found in Title III.87  
Because Title III does not include video surveillance techniques but does 
address surreptitious aural interception, it was used as a guide in 
formulating the requirements for surreptitious visual interception.  By 
interweaving these doctrines, the Torres court was able to impose more 
strict rules upon the use of video surveillance—a technique it found to be 
increasingly intrusive and in need of such additional constraints.88 
 
[36] Following the Torres ruling, six other federal circuits joined the 
Seventh Circuit’s reasoning and application of the standard used in Torres 
as the benchmark from which to begin interpretations of the 
                                                                                                        
83 United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1984) (reinforcing the notion that this 
particular issue had not yet been addressed). 
84 Id. at 877-82.  
85 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c) provides in pertinent part, Property or persons which may be 
seized with a warrant.  A warrant may be issued under this rule to search for and seize any  
(1) property that constitutes evidence of the commission of a criminal 
offense; or (2) contraband, the fruits of crime, or things otherwise 
criminally possessed; or (3) property designed or intended for use or 
which is or has been used as the means of committing a criminal 
offense; or (4) person for whose arrest there is probable cause, or who is 
unlawfully restrained. 
86 See United States v. Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536, 542 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that Rule 
41(b) permits a district court to issue warrants for silent video surveillance); see also, 
United States v. Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433, 1436 (10th Cir. 1990) (“Rule 41 is 
sufficiently flexible to include within its scope electronic intrusions authorized upon a 
finding of probable cause.”) (quoting United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 
169 (1977)).  
87 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (2001). 
88 Simmons, supra note 10, at 558 (“[A] warrant for video surveillance should require a 
higher showing by the government than a warrant for a traditional search, and since video 
surveillance is ‘identical in its indiscriminate character to wiretapping and bugging,’ the 
rules which apply to wiretapping and bugging should also apply to video surveillance.”). 
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constitutionality of surreptitious video surveillance. 89  The general 
standard implemented by these seven circuits, with slight departures, 
requires that a warrant based on probable cause must be properly issued by 
a neutral and detached judicial officer before such surveillance can 
proceed, just as required by the Fourth Amendment.  By then looking to 
Title III’s narrow requirements, these courts further require that for any 
investigation 
 
(1) the judge issuing the warrant must find that ‘normal 
investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or 
reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be 
too dangerous . . . (2) the warrant must contain ‘a particular 
description of the type of communication sought to be 
intercepted, and a statement of the particular offense to 
which it relates,’ . . . (3) the warrant must not allow the 
period of interception to be ‘longer than is necessary to 
achieve the objective of the authorization . . . or in any event 
longer than thirty days,’ (though extensions are possible) . . . 
and (4) the warrant must require that the interception ‘be 
conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of 
communications not otherwise subject to interception.’90    
 
[37] While the remaining five circuits have adhered to the Torres court’s 
characterization of video surveillance as an investigative technique that 
carries the potential for increased intrusiveness, they have not applied the 
Seventh Circuit’s approach in their analyses.  This divergence in judicial 
treatment has created a rift in the propriety of this investigative technique, 
leaving open the possibility for inconsistent evidentiary rulings from one 
jurisdiction to the next, irregularity in practices by police agencies, and 
confusion in understanding Fourth Amendment rights by defendants.   
 
 
                                          
89 The six circuits that have followed the Torres court’s analysis include: Second Circuit in 
United States v. Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504 (2nd Cir. 1986); Third Circuit in United States v. 
Williams, 124 F.3d 411 (3rd Cir. 1997); Fifth Circuit in United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 
821 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1987); Eighth Circuit in United States v. Falls, 34 F.3d 674 (8th 
Cir. 1994); Ninth Circuit in United States v, Nerber, 222 F.3d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 2000); 
and Tenth Circuit in United States v. Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433, 1442 (10th Cir. 1990).  
90 Koyomejian, 970 F.2d at 542.  
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II. BYPASSING ANY JUDICIAL SCRUTINY: USE OF SNITCHES 
 
[38] The confluence of the laws governing video surveillance and the use 
of undercover informants creates a doctrinal problem.  Undercover 
informants - or snitches - are widely used today as a valuable and efficient 
investigative tool by police agencies.91  The use of a consenting snitch in 
obtaining non-video surveillance has been recognized by the courts as 
unproblematic with regards to the Fourth Amendment.92  Taking the 
analysis one step further, however, use of a consenting snitch to obtain 
surreptitious video surveillance effectively creates a regulatory loophole by 
allowing the investigating officers to bypass all procedural requirements 
upon obtaining the snitch’s consent.  By obtaining the consent of a snitch, 
the government is relieved of the procedural obligations as required by 
both the Fourth Amendment and Title III.  It is in this scenario that the 
intrusiveness of video surveillance is essentially disregarded, since the 
protective mechanisms such as the warrant requirement and review 
processes no longer need to be satisfied.  
 
A.  CURRENT LAW GOVERNING THE USE OF SNITCHES IN UNDERCOVER 
INVESTIGATIONS 
 
[39] The use of informants by law enforcement has become a widely 
utilized investigative mechanism.  The basic “snitch” structure usually 
involves participating informants, who are commonly criminals 
themselves, agreeing to work alongside law enforcement officials in 
exchange for lenience or exculpation for past or present offenses.93   
 
[40] Various scholars have commented on the legal and societal 
consequences that arise from this type of quid pro quo arrangement.94  
Common concerns include, but are not limited to: unjustified invasions of 
privacy, heightened intrusions on individual autonomy, entrapment, 
decreased social control, negative public perception of law enforcement 
                                          
91 See Susan S. Kuo, Official Indiscretions: Considering Sex Bargains with Government 
Informants, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1643, 1649-50 (2005).  
92 See e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301-302 (1966).  
93 See Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The Institutional and Communal Consequences, 73 
U. CIN. L. REV. 645, 651-52 (2004).  
94 See generally id.; see also MARX, supra note 12. 
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and the justice system, and instances of internal corruption.95  These 
concerns have proliferated as the prevalence of undercover snitch 
investigations has rapidly increased.  
 
[41] Judicial and legislative characterization of informant-aided 
investigations has lent support for this hybrid form of plea-bargaining 
benefiting the snitch, while bolstering arguments in favor of maintaining 
this practice in its current form.96  Notwithstanding the greater ease and 
reliability associated with garnering evidence through snitch investigations, 
the practice of utilizing informants is left largely unregulated.97   
 
[42] A line of cases decided by the United States Supreme Court and Title 
III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 196898 illustrate 
favorable judicial and legislative treatment provided to snitch 
investigations.  The current trend leans toward placing greater discretion at 
the hands of law enforcement, and less weight on the importance of the 
after-the-fact review process.  The complacency by the courts with regards 
to use of snitches has led to confidence by law enforcement agencies in 
using confidential informants as a vehicle to carry out surreptitious video 
surveillance. 
 
B.  JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE USE OF SNITCHES 
 
[43] The United States Supreme Court visited the topic of snitch 
investigations, in isolation, in a series of cases involving informants who, 
while acting in concert with the government, consented to surveillance of 
conversations that ultimately implicated their cohorts.  The common thread 
in these decisions lies in the Court’s finding that there is no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in conversations between criminal cohorts or co-
conspirators regarding past, present, or future activities that are criminal in 
                                          
95 See MARX, supra note 12, at 33. 
96 Id. at 45-54  (“Recent judicial and legislative changes have encouraged the spread of 
undercover tactics in two general ways: indirectly, by creating new restrictions on 
conventional forms of police investigative behavior; and directly, by broadening their 
legal foundation.” Id. at 46).  
97 Natapoff, supra note 93 at 669 (citing James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of 
Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV.1521, 1566 (1981)).  
98 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (2001). 
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nature.99  To add to this finding, the Court has also found that using 
technological tools (such as those used for electronic surveillance) adds no 
additional intrusion and no further violation of this privacy expectation.100   
 
[44] In On Lee v. United States,101 the Court validated the single-party 
consent rule, essentially finding that when one party to a conversation 
consents to the electronic surveillance of that conversation, there is no need 
to demonstrate probable cause or even to obtain a warrant, since those 
circumstances fail to implicate the Fourth Amendment or its 
requirements.102  In On Lee, the government placed a microphone on its 
snitch, Chin Poy, which transmitted the contents of On Lee’s incriminating 
statements to the agents located outside.  The Court’s analysis hinged on 
the fact that no physical trespass103 had occurred since Chin Poy was 
considered an invited guest and found no violation of the surveillee’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy.   
 
[45] Similarly, in United States v. White, a tape-recorder placed on the 
person of an informant provided the Government with audiotapes 
containing incriminating statements made by the defendant which were 
admitted into evidence in lieu of the informant’s testimony.104  The Court 
re-characterized On Lee’s single-party consent rule by focusing more 
heavily on the surveillee than on the snitch.  The Court ultimately 
formulated its analysis on the theory of assumption of the risk rather than 
the affirmative consent of a cooperating snitch.105   As one commentator 
                                          
99 See e.g., Hofffa, 385 U.S. at 301-303.  
100 See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963). 
101 On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952). 
102 See Captain Timothy A. Raezer, Needed Weapons in the Army’s War on Drugs: 
Electronic Surveillance and Informants, 116 MIL. L. REV. 1, at 6 (1987).  
103 Cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
104 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 747 (1971). 
105 White, 401 U.S. at 751-52; see, Raezer, supra, note 102, at 15  
This theory [stated in White] was based upon the premise that the 
defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy that the 
person with whom he spoke would keep the conversation secret.  
Because a party to a conversation can reveal it without violating the 
defendant’s expectation of privacy, the consenting party’s recording or 
transmitting of that conversation, likewise, does not violate the 
defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy.  In short, a person 
assumes the risk that the other party to a conversation will reveal, 
transmit, or record it. 
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said, the Court found that, by talking to another person, the defendant 
surveillee had assumed the risk that his conversation would be repeated or 
was being recorded and consequently had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in its contents.106  
 
[46] The implications of On Lee’s ruling on more intrusive investigative 
techniques, such as covert video surveillance with snitches, are important 
to consider: 
 
Abolition of On Lee would not end electronic 
eavesdropping.  It would prevent public officials from 
engaging in that practice unless they first had probable 
cause to suspect an individual of involvement in illegal 
activities and had tested their version of the facts before a 
detached judicial officer.  The interest On Lee fails to 
protect is the expectation of the ordinary citizen, who has 
never engaged in illegal conduct in his life, that he may 
carry on his private discourse freely, openly, and 
spontaneously without measuring his every word against the 
connotations it might carry when instantaneously heard by 
others unknown to him and unfamiliar with his situation or 
analyzed in a cold, formal record played days, months, or 
years after the conversation.  Interposition of a warrant 
requirement is designed not to shield ‘wrongdoers,’ but to 
secure a measure of privacy and a sense of personal security 
throughout our society.107 
 
[47] While the general tenets of the assumption of the risk doctrine are 
meant to remove any benefit of the doubt criminal wrongdoers would 
retain in their illegal activities, the scope of this doctrine reaches much 
further.  The majority of the Court has not visited this quandary, but Justice 
                                          
106 Cf., Tom P. Conom, Privacy and the Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First Century, 
19 CHAMPION 13 (1995) The author criticizes the Court’s decision in White by stating, 
“The Supreme Court adopted the false and pernicious assumption of the risk doctrine in 
which a citizen is said to forfeit all constitutional protections against electronic 
surveillance by the mere act of communicating with a fellow citizen.” Id. at 13-14.  
107 White, 401 U.S. at 789-90. 
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Harlan visited the problem this carve-out creates in his dissenting opinion 
in White.108  
 
The critical question, therefore, is whether under our system 
of government, as reflected in the Constitution, we should 
impose on our citizens the risks of the electronic listener or 
observer without at least the protection of a warrant 
requirement.  This question must, in my view, be answered 
by assessing the nature of a particular practice and the likely 
extent of its impact on the individual’s sense of security 
balanced against the utility of the conduct as a technique of 
law enforcement.  For those more extensive intrusions that 
significantly jeopardize the sense of security which is the 
paramount concern of Fourth Amendment liberties, I am of 
the view that more self-restraint by law enforcement 
officials is required and at the least warrants should be 
necessary.109 
 
Despite this recognition, however, both Congress and the Supreme Court 
have left a hole in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  By failing to 
recognize Fourth Amendment limitations when only one party to the 
conversation being surveilled has consented, the Court has created a path 
by which law enforcement officials can avoid the warrant requirement and 
its prerequisites. 
                                          
108 In Lopez, the Court ruled that the use of technological tools to heighten the reliability 
of evidence does not implicitly generate any greater intrusion than that which may be 
heard by the human ear, or recanted by the informant’s memory. Lopez, 373 U.S. at 438.  
However, Justice Harlan made a point in White to clarify that this characterization, as 
found in both Harlan and Lopez, is not necessarily applicable to surreptitious video 
surveillance carried out in conjunction with informant consent.  In his dissenting opinion 
he noted that “in Hoffa, Mr. Justice Stewart took care to mention that ‘surreptitious’ 
monitoring was not there before the Court, and so too in Lopez.” White, 401 U.S. at 758.  
Justice Harlan went on to further clarify that “the issue of the informer’s consent to 
utilization of this technique is not properly before [the Court].” Id. at 771.  See also Hoffa 
v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966). 
109 White, 401 U.S. at 786-87 (Harlan, J. dissenting). 




C.  LEGISLATIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE USE OF SNITCHES 
 
[48] Title III provides clear guidelines that make it lawful for a person “to 
intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication,110 where such person is 
a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication 
has given prior consent to such interception.”111  Essentially, Title III 
allows law enforcement to circumvent the warrant requirement, or any 
comparable prerequisite, if it utilizes a snitch in its investigation.112  As 
long as a participating informant is a party to the conversation surveilled or 
recorded, the officers carrying out that investigation need not jump the 
numerous administrative hoops otherwise required.113   
 
[49] In line with the Supreme Court’s characterization, Title III’s 
deregulation of snitch investigations is largely based on the doctrines of 
implied consent and assumption of the risk.114 Assessing the convergence 
of Title III with the use of a snitch, Justice Harlan in his dissenting opinion 
in United States v. White found cause for concern: 
 
[T]he comprehensive provisions of Title III are evidence of 
the extent of congressional concern with the impact of 
electronic surveillance on the right to privacy.  This concern 
is further manifested in the introductory section of the 
Senate Committee Report.  Although §2511(2)(c) exempts 
                                          
110 Title III was amended in 1986 by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), 
which prompted the inclusion of “electronic communications” to wire and oral 
communications. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2000); see also S. REP. 99-541 (1986).  
111 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (2001). 
112 See, MARX, supra note 10, at 55 (“Most of the electronic surveillance associated with 
covert means is not subject to a warrant restriction because it occurs either in public or in 
situations where one of the parties consents… The single-party consent laws found in 
most states permit this.”). 
113 See, Pub. L No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (West 1968). The rationale for this relaxation of 
the Constitutional requirements can be gleaned from the legislative comments 
accompanying the statute. 
114 See, Slobogin, supra note 32, at 20-24.  Despite an absence of exigent circumstances, 
some courts have sanctioned certain searches and seizures that have been conducted 
without a warrant.  Rationales for permitting such warrantless action are based on the 
doctrines of implied consent and assumption of the risk.  Namely, that an individual who 
engages in criminal conduct assumes the risk that their cohort is acting in concert with the 
Government, for the purpose of implicating that individual.  This rationale goes hand-in-
hand with the Supreme Court’s adjudication of this issue. 
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consensual and participant monitoring by law enforcement 
agents from the general prohibitions against surveillance 
without prior judicial authorization and makes the fruits 
admissible in court, see §2515, congressional malaise with 
such conduct is evidence by the contrastingly limited 
endorsement of consensual surveillance carried out by 
private individuals.115  
 
[50] Nonetheless, the use of a snitch was recognized by the majority as a 
means to bypass the requirements of Title III.116  As Harlan articulates, 
“All these values are sacrificed by a rule of law that permits official 
monitoring of private discourse limited only by the need to locate a willing 
assistant.”117  This sentiment is further aggravated by use of more intrusive 
means of surveillance such as video surveillance. 
 
III.  EXPLOITING THE REGULATORY LOOPHOLE: USING THE SNITCH TO 
OBTAIN SURREPTITIOUS VIDEO SURVEILLANCE 
 
[51] The Supreme Court has not yet definitively ruled on the convergence 
of snitch consent and its impact on the regulation of covert video 
surveillance.118  Current jurisprudence in this area is largely governed by 
the respective approaches taken by the lower circuit courts facing this 
dilemma.  However, little or no consideration has been given by legislators 
or scholars as to the consequences of importing the single party consent 
doctrine or the assumption of the risk justification for the propriety of 
snitch-obtained evidence into the context of more intrusive video 
                                          
115 White, 401 U.S. at 791 (italics in original) (citing 82 Stat. 212, 18 U.S.C. §2510, S. 
REP. NO. 1097, at 69 (1968)).  
116 See generally White, 401 U.S. at 745.  
117 Id. at 788-89. 
118 See Conom, supra, note 106, at 20, n. 27  
The critical question is, does the Fourth Amendment apply to video surveillance 
so that video invasion of privacy may only be accomplished by prior judicial 
review and issuance of a limiting warrant?  The federal courts of appeals which 
have to date considered this issue are unanimous that the Fourth Amendment 
does apply to video surveillance.   However, the Supreme Court has not yet 
spoken. 
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surveillance gathering (as assessed by the courts to be issues of Title III 
and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).119 
 
[52] The most obvious ramification of this confluence of these distinct 
issues is its effect on the warrant requirement.  Although Title III 
anticipates the use of snitches as a means of bypassing the default warrant 
requirement,120 the statute fails to sanction video surveillance.  Only 
through judicial application of Title III to investigations utilizing covert 
video surveillance, falling outside the explicit confines of the statute, are 
law enforcement officials provided the opportunity to bypass the warrant 
requirement121 and maintain a heightened level of discretion in all aspects 
of the investigation.  All that is needed is a cooperating informant—a 
snitch that consents to carrying out the surreptitious video surveillance.  By 
projecting the one-party consent exception found in Title III as well as the 
assumption of the risk doctrine applied to more traditional methods of 
wiretapping, snitches make it easier for investigating officers to conduct 
their investigations without judicial or legislative scrutiny.  Investigations 
can proceed without many of the common procedural requirements 
including but not limited to, prior judicial approval, 122 a foundational 
showing of probable cause particularity and limitations in the scope of the 
investigation, or ex post judicial review to ensure propriety of law 
enforcement actions.  By advancing Title III into subject matter not 
contemplated by the legislature, the courts allow snitches to produce an 
investigatory carte blanche unregulated by the legislatures and unresolved 
by the courts. 
 
[53] The application of assumption of the risk or single-party consent 
jurisprudence onto the incidence of snitch aided video surveillance is 
equally problematic.  Directing this doctrine to a situation involving video 
                                          
119 Although the courts, legislators, and scholars have commented on the intrusiveness of 
video surveillance or on the use of snitches, generally, there has been no meaningful 
assessment of the implications of the convergence of the two areas. 
120 See Michael Goldsmith, Criminal Law: The Supreme Court and Title III: Rewriting the 
Law of Electronic Surveillance (Part 1 of 2), 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 3, n.1 
(“Title III…does not cover so-called ‘consensual’ electronic surveillance in which one 
party…consents to the eavesdropping. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(c)-(d)”). 
121 By bypassing the warrant requirement, I am referring to both ex ante authorization 
(including the showing of probable cause, particularity in the affidavit, and magisterial 
approval), as well as ex post review to ensure that the search was carried out properly. 
122 See, Slobogin supra note 32, at 107, n. 40.  
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surveillance is similarly inappropriate, without adequately taking the 
intrusiveness of this investigative method into consideration. 
 
[54] With regards to both areas of jurisprudence, however, the regulatory 
inconsistencies and trivialization of the warrant requirement are the 
inevitable dangers of allowing this means of circumvention of the warrant 
requirement to stand in its current form. 
 
A.  REGULATORY INCONSISTENCIES ARISE FROM CIRCUMVENTION OF THE 
WARRANT REQUIREMENT 
 
[55] By having neutral and detached judicial officers review and facilitate 
the execution of a traditional warrant, the grant of power and discretion is 
effectively bifurcated.  Despite the fact that there are numerous other 
political entities that could take charge of regulating the scope and breadth 
of law enforcement activity, judicial officers act effectively in this role, as 
they are often the most impartial and detached party.123  Since the law 
enforcement officials involved in the matter are purported to have a 
disproportionately greater interest in the outcome of the investigation, 
placing the grant of authority in the hands of judicial officers works to 
effectuate less bias within the judicial system by creating a system of 
checks and balances.124  
 
[56] The interests at stake underscore the danger in irregularity of 
discretionary power.  Because surreptitious video surveillance has the 
potential to thwart individual liberties and personal privacy interests more 
than other forms of traditional police searches and non-video surveillance, 
this regulatory inconsistency has far-reaching implications that have not 
even been considered.  Professor Ric Simmons has commented on the 
regulatory inconsistencies in these types of hyper-intrusive searches, noting 
that,  “The lack of a coherent constitutional framework for analyzing 
hyper-intrusive searches is all the more startling and problematic in an era 
when modern technologies and shifting political attitudes are generating 
new opportunities for the government to conduct ever more intrusive 
searches.”125  Furthermore, a blanket disposal of the warrant requirement 
                                          
123 See, Id. at 107. 
124 Natapoff, supra note 93 at 658.   
125 Simmons, supra note 10, at 549. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XIII, Issue1 
 
29 
absolves the courts of the opportunity to articulate a stance on the use of 
more intrusive surveillance techniques by bootstrapping on the exceptions 
afforded to the use of snitches. 
 
 
B. RENDERING THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT MEANINGLESS 
 
[57] The assumption of the risk doctrine works to disintegrate any 
expectation of privacy a defendant may have, whether qualified by the 
circumstances or not.  The ease with which this expectation is disregarded 
provides law enforcement with the opportunity to overstep their bounds, 
whether in fact justified or not.  The rationales for stripping a criminal 
actor of his or her expectation of privacy when he or she is engaged in 
illegal activity have been stated by the Supreme Court.126  However, the 
legitimacy of any generalized presumption, such as the assumption of the 
risk doctrine, must be questioned when it is indiscriminately extended to 
particularized circumstances such as the use of new surveillance 
technologies. 
 
[58] If the assumption of the risk doctrine extinguishes any existing 
expectation of privacy one might have when they are dealing with criminal 
cohorts, shouldn’t one first be aware that such a risk is present if they are 
held to have assumed it?  “In order to assume a risk, one must first know 
what the risk is.”127  Tom P. Conom visits the counterintuitive foundation 
of the assumption of the risk doctrine, as set forth in White, by noting: 
 
Unless the White plurality truly is willing to saddle 
American society with the universal risk that every 
conversation may be electronically monitored, then the 
White plurality view is not only illogical and 
unreasonable—it is absurd.  Moreover, it defies common 
sense as well as the common understanding of Americans 
who yet have some sensitivity to the ‘qualitative difference’ 
between electronic surveillance and conventional police 
investigation.128 
                                          
126 See generally United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 747 (1971); see also Hoffa v. 
United States, 385 U.S. 293, 293(1966). 
127 Conom, supra note 106, at 18. 
128 Id. 
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If a snitch is wired with a hidden video camera which captures 
incriminating evidence beyond the scope of the snitch’s conversation with 
the surveillee, it should be unreasonable to presume that the surveillee 
assumed such a risk by merely conversing with a cooperating informant.   
 
[59] Professor A. Westin has observed the societal consequences that may 
develop as long as snitch consent continues to provide this regulatory 
loophole in the context of the expanding area of hyper-intrusive searches: 
 
Allowing eavesdropping with the consent of one party 
would destroy the statutory plan of limiting the offenses for 
which eavesdropping by device can be used and insisting on 
a court-order process.  And as technology enables every 
man to carry his micro-miniaturized recorder everywhere he 
goes and allows every room to be monitored surreptitiously 
by built-in equipment, permitting eavesdropping with the 
consent of one part would be to sanction a means of 
reproducing conversation that could choke off much vital 
social exchange.129 
 
If this were the case, societal distrust and inter-social withdrawal would 
permeate American culture, even among those not involved in illegal or 
criminal activities.  In addition to this “denigration of [the] individual is the 
damage undercover police work causes to the democratic state’s objective 
of remaining legitimate.  First, because it relies on fraud and deceit, covert 
investigation undermines trust in the government.  More important, it 
increases distrust in everyone, since anyone could be a government 
agent.”130  Every individual would perpetually be walking on eggshells for 
fear that any misstep—even in the presence of close friends or family—
could be used against them, regardless of any perceptual privacy interest 
they may hold.  This is not the type of societal interaction America should 
be looking forward to. 
 
[60] Cooperating snitches that consent to such monitoring are not held to 
the same standard of accountability, but rather, are allowed to engage in 
otherwise illegal conduct under the administrative shield against 
                                          
129 White, 401 U.S. at 789, n.23. 
130 Slobogin, supra note 32, at 104.  
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liability.131  Ultimately, these snitches have become the tools by which law 
enforcement officials and investigators have been able to violate otherwise 
viable privacy interests without repercussion or suppression.  Supreme 
Court decisions, which allow undercover police activity to proceed without 
ex ante execution of a valid warrant trivializes individual rights and 
interests by garbling the underlying basis for the assumption of the risk 
doctrine.132  A snitch’s unilateral consent, in and of itself, should not be 
deemed an automatic grant of blanket authorization to engage in any 
method of investigation without regulation, guidelines, or parameters.  Yet 
the current state of jurisprudence in this area grants this very sort of 
boundless sanction,133 thereby rendering the protections of the warrant 
requirements ineffective and the process of obtaining a warrant 
meaningless. 
 
C.  INEVITABLE ABUSES BY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS 
 
[61] The confluence of the regulations governing both snitch consent and 
video surveillance currently allow (and even endorse) law enforcement 
officials to make an end-run around the very constitutional safeguards set 
in place to limit the scope of their authority.  Several cases decided by the 
Supreme Court134 have accentuated the notion that law enforcement 
discretion must be limited, as they are not suited to place limits on their 
own authority.135 
 
[62] In Johnson v. United States,136 the Supreme Court went great lengths 
to underscore the importance of the warrant requirement in the preservation 
of individual rights against the threat of excessive police discretion. 
 
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not 
grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law 
                                          
131 See generally Natapoff, supra note 93. 
132 See Slobogin, supra note 32, at 107.  
133 Id. 
134 See e.g. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, (1967); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 
(1964); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948). 
135 See Slobogin, supra note 32, at 29 (“In light of the police’s tendency to be overly 
suspicious and to undervalue individual prerogatives, we might want to force them to seek 
authorization in every case.”). 
136 Johanson, 333 U.S. 10 (1948). 
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enforcement the support of the usual inferences which 
reasonable men draw from evidence.  Its protection consists 
in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and 
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer 
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out 
crime.  Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a 
magistrate’s disinterested determination to issue a search 
warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a 
warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave 
the people’s homes secure only in the discretion of police 
officers…The right of officers to thrust themselves into a 
home is also a grave concern, not only to the individual but 
to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security 
and freedom from surveillance.  When the right of privacy 
must reasonably yield to the right of a search is, as a rule, to 
be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or a 
government enforcement agent.137 
 
Snitch consent, by eliminating the need for a warrant, has denigrated this 
principle of power-shifting and has worked to promote the very situation 
the Supreme Court in Johnson so vehemently condemned. 
 
[63] The Court in Beck v. Ohio also criticized these law enforcement 
principles when it noted that the investigators’ failure to obtain a warrant in 
Katz substituted “the far less reliable procedure of an after-the-event 
justification for the . . . search, too likely to be subtly influenced by the 
familiar shortcomings of hindsight judgment.”138 
 
[64] Placing this almost immeasurable amount of discretion in the hands of 
law enforcement officials provides them the opportunity to engage in 
surveillance (searches and seizures) in an indiscriminate manner with the 
opportunity to fill in the gaps of minimization, necessity, and particularity 
after-the-fact.  This discretion permits police officers to invade otherwise 
protected rights with minimal fears of penalization by means of ex post 
review, suppression, or reprimand. 
 
                                          
137 Id. at 13-14.  
138 Beck, 379 U.S. at 96.  
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[65] The consequence of this regulatory loophole is the increase in the 
potential for abuse.  We already face an inherent dilemma in our current 
method of dealing with exploitation of police discretion.  The efficacy of 
the exclusionary rule as a deterrent for the abuse of police authority has 
consistently been questioned.139  Permitting blanket discretion on more 
violative intrusions, by means of circumvention of the warrant requirement, 
will further confound attempts at discouraging unlawful police action and 
unjustified personal intrusions.140  Ignoring this gap in regulation has the 
potential to allow, or even promote, reprehensible police conduct that may 
go unpunished.  Insofar as this heightened level of discretion is provided, 
abuses of law enforcement authority may continue to run rampant, without 
fear of regulatory intervention.  As police power escalates, so may societal 
distrust and antipathy.   
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
[66] In the current world of digital technology where innovations and 
advancements are progressing by the millisecond, video cameras, video 
surveillance, and visual recording equipment are now considered obsolete 
technology.  Without regulation of technology that has been widely used 
by the general public for several decades, what can we expect of 
regulations for up-and-coming advances in tools that can intrude on an 
individual’s personal privacy? 
 
[67] By continuing on a regulatory path lacking specifically tailored 
legislation, particularly in dealing with the troublesome combination of 
snitch cooperation and covert video surveillance, we are perpetuating a 
problem that will only inflate at the rate of technological innovation.  
                                          
139 See generally Slobogin, supra note 32, at 8-12 (arguing that the United State’s 
exclusionary rule, which is meant to act as a deterrent against unlawful police behavior, is 
ineffective as there is not direct penalization that effects the law enforcement officer—
rather, it is the suppression of evidence that acts as a slap on the wrist).   
140 See Id. at 36-37.  Police discretion is not minimized significantly by administrative or 
regulatory procedures, which attempt to create some sort of standardization in dealing 
with this matter.  There still needs to be some kind of ex post review system to ensure that 
law enforcement officials are always held responsible to answer to an authority, to report 
on their actions and conduct, and to conduct themselves with the foresight of possible 
reprimand for improper behavior or actions. 
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Advances in technology, such as facial recognition technology141 and 
biometrics, will only provide law enforcement with future surveillance 
equipment and unimaginable tools that invade the most intimate of 
locations.142 
 
[68] Even at this point, however, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has not 
ventured into the present circumstances, let alone future horizons, while 
allowing regulatory loopholes to suppress judicial and legislative grappling 
of the important issues.  Without a strong resolve to establish a uniform 
framework of the protections of the Fourth Amendment and a resolve to 
refrain from expounding on old frameworks while overlooking important 
advancements and distinctions, a slippery slope will render our Fourth 
Amendment rights and protections a fiction. 
                                          
141 See generally, Milligan, supra, note 14 at 309-11 (showing how investigators can 
match a face to a specific name or an image and retrieve tremendous amounts of 
information on that individual including information, the existence of which, is unknown 
to the subject). 
142 See generally Max Guirguis, Electronic Visual Surveillance and the Reasonable 
Expectation of Privacy, 9 J. TECH. L & POL’Y 143 (2004). 
